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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines USSOCOM’s proposal to educate IW 
strategists / campaign planners, and compares it to the 
existing model utilized by SAMS for educating conventional 
campaign planners.  SAMS is a good comparative model because 
the SAMS program has a proven record in conventional 
campaign planning.  Simply put, SAMS is a success and a 
model for other advanced ILE programs.  This comparative 
analysis extracts educational “best practices” from both 
approaches and makes recommendations for consideration.  
Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally 
challenging problem.  At the end, the thesis identifies 
future research opportunities for the utilization of 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
A. BACKGROUND 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognized 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) ability to plan, fight and 
win conventional conflicts, noting that the “U.S. Military 
was without equal in the planning and execution of 
conventional warfare.”  It is the argument in this thesis 
that this accomplishment would not have been possible 
without the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies 
(SAMS) program.  However, the QDR also pointed out the need 
for equally qualified irregular warfare (IW) planners, to 
plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute IW campaigns.  In 
response to the QDR, the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap 
specifically addressed the need to improve DoD’s ability to 
conduct irregular warfare.1  Consequently, the IW Execution 
Roadmap established specific educational requirements for 
each military service and United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM).2  The IW Roadmap established a timeline 
for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to 
develop a strategy to identify and educate Irregular Warfare 
Specialists (IW planners).  
The Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense has 
primary responsibility for all the Execution Roadmaps, with 
each roadmap having a co-lead from the Joint Staff and 
                     
1  The Joint Staff created eight execution roadmaps, including IW.  
2 SOCOM was the only Combatant Command tasked for two reasons.  
First, SOCOM has “Service-like” responsibilities; second, the QDR 
Execution Roadmap recognized Special Operations unique IW requirements.   
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Office of Secretary of Defense.3  This thesis focuses only 
on the IW Roadmap.  The IW Roadmap Executive Committee 
(EXCOM) co-chairs are Mr. Ryan Henry Principle Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD) and Lieutenant 
General (LTG) Doug Lute Director of Operations, J-3 the 
Joint Staff.  The IW Roadmap tasks were not just for the 
Services; USSOCOM was tasked as well.  According to the IW 
Execution Roadmap, DoD is required to institute thirty-one 
separate tasks, or initiatives.  This thesis addresses only 
the two major education tasks and USSOCOM’s unclassified 
education requirements in order to ensure the thesis widest 
potential distribution.  In response to this tasking, the 
CJCS released a Deputy Secretary of Defense approved “action 
memo” on March 20, 2007.4  This action memorandum detailed 
the “way ahead” by which the individual Services and USSOCOM 
would create an education process to provide a very diverse 
set of tools to fight and win an irregular warfare campaign 
or conflict. 
B. THESIS PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis examines USSOCOM’s proposal to educate IW 
planners.  It then asks can USSOCOM’s current educational 
initiatives successfully create IW planners, in accordance 
with the QDR directives.  The thesis compares USSOCOM’s 
response to the existing SAMS model.  The SAMS model is a 
good comparative model due to its proven record in 
                     
3 Christine Osowski, “Approaching the QDR as a Process,” The Avascent 
Review 10 (2006), 2. 
4 Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
action memo, IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8 Plan, (U.S. Department of 
Defense, Washington, D.C., 16 February 2008). 
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conventional campaign planning.5  Simply put, it is the 
author’s opinion that SAMS is a success at teaching 
conventional operational planning and a model for other 
programs.  This comparative analysis extracts educational 
“best practices” from both approaches and makes 
recommendations for consideration.  Even with an optimal 
approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem.  
At the end, the thesis identifies future research 
opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM’s IW educated 
officers. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a comparative case study analysis to 
compare two systems in order to determine whether USSOCOM 
can successfully create IW planners, in accordance with QDR 
directives, based on their current educational initiatives.  
This thesis reviews how the SAMS program came into 
existence, evolved, how SAMS students are educated, and why 
that education has proven to be one of DoD’s best 
institutions for the development of campaign planners.  This 
comparative analysis identifies “key take aways” and “best 
practices” from both programs, with an eye toward 
integrating such practices into an alternative USSOCOM IW 
education program. 
D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
 Chapter I introduces the topic, defines the thesis 
problem and outlines the main topics for each chapter. 
                     
5 SAMS graduates have participated in contingency operations, 
including Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy and, 
most recently, Iraqi Freedom. 
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 Chapter II discusses the history of the QDR and 
creation of the IW Execution Roadmap.  It traces the IW 
education process from the QDR through the Execution 
Roadmap.  This chapter also briefly examines the Services 
plans to educate IW specialists.    
 Chapter III examines USSOCOM’s plan for IW education.  
This chapter covers the three-tiered SOF Strategist/Campaign 
Planner Education Concept, developed by the Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU).  This concept includes 
education from a variety of sources, including the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Special Operations Masters Degree 
Program (SOMDP). 
Chapter IV examines the Advanced Military Studies 
Program (AMSP) at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced 
Military Studies (SAMS) to determine the attributes and 
skills that make SAMS graduates so successful.  This chapter 
reviews the development of the SAMS program, selection 
criteria for student attendance, faculty selection, teaching 
method and curriculum.  
 Chapter V is a comparative analysis of the SAMS program 
and USSOCOM’s proposed IW education process.  This chapter 
compares student selection, faculty, teaching methods and 
curriculum between the two programs.  After analyzing the 
SAMS course in conventional campaign planning, are there 
lessons that USSOCOM can learn?  If so, should USSOCOM 
import portions of this successful program into their own IW 
education concept?  Is there a capabilities gap between 
conventional campaign planners and those educated in the 
SOMDP at NPS? 
 Chapter VI acts as a thesis summary, determining best 
practices from both the USSOCOM proposed plan and the 
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existing SAMS program.  It provides recommendations from the 
SAMS program to improve USSOCOM’s proposed IW education 
process.  The chapter concludes with the author’s model of a 
USSOCOM IW Strategist / Campaign Planner education program. 
 Chapter VII proposes several areas for further 
research.  These areas include cost considerations for 
expanding SOMDP, a manpower survey to determine the number 
and placement of IW Strategist / Campaign Planners 
throughout DoD and the development of an additional skill 
identifier (ASI) designating SOMDP graduates as SOF IW 
Strategist / Campaign Planners.  Other areas may include 
using the findings of this thesis as a springboard to expand 
IW education within the individual Services’ PME programs. 
 6
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II. THE QDR, IW EXECUTION ROADMAP AND THE SERVICES’ 
PLANS 
A. HISTORY OF THE QDR 
 After the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the 
Soviet Union, it became apparent to Congress that the Cold 
War strategy of containment, with its force-sizing and 
force-shaping constructs, was fast becoming dangerously 
obsolete.  With no single superpower to challenge the United 
States, DoD required a new method to determine the size and 
scope of the U.S. military.  In 1997, Senator Dan Coats of 
Indiana and Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut 
sponsored legislation establishing the Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR).  The QDR requires the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct a review of military threats every four years and to 
present its findings to Congress.  The intent is to keep the 
U.S. military fully aligned with emerging threats.   
 Secretary of Defense William Cohen produced the first 
QDR in 1997.  This review introduced the idea of a 
"revolution in military affairs," an early version of 
"transformation.”6  The three major points of the first QDR 
included the development  
[of an]overarching defense strategy to deal with 
the world today and tomorrow, identify required 
military capabilities, and define the programs 
and policies needed to support them.  Building on 
the President's National Security Strategy, we 
determined that U.S. defense strategy for the 
near and long term must continue to shape the 
strategic environment to advance U.S. interests, 
                     
6 Tom Donnelly, “Kill the QDR,” Armed Forces Journal, February 2006, 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813832. 
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maintain the capability to respond to the full 
spectrum of threats, and prepare now for the 
threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond.7    
The new approach was “revolutionary” because for the 
first time since 1946 the U.S. military was creating a 
strategy to engage and defeat enemies other then Communist 
nations.  The second QDR was released on September 30, 2001.  
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said the QDR had 
been "largely completed" prior to the September 11th attacks 
and that the events of that day "confirm" the QDR's basic 
direction, particularly the move toward homeland defense and 
preparations for counterterrorism.  Despite Wolfowitz’s 
testimony, the events of 9/11 overshadowed this QDR and the 
military appeared lethargic in its ability to react 
decisively against the non-state perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks.  The requirement to pursue a transnational 
terrorist organization caused Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld to scrap his transformation plans for a “light, 
fast, technology-driven” armed forces, that would be able to 
“assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat” any opponent.  The 
U.S. military’s stated goal in early 2001 was to “be strong 
enough to deter an opponent from aggression, and if 
deterrence fails, America's armed forces must be able to 
decisively defeat any opponent.”8  This mission statement, 
predicated on expectations that the country’s primary 
threats would come from “nation states,” did not adequately 
address asymmetric threats such as religious fundamentalism, 
                     
7 William Cohen, The QDR of 1997, info accessed via internet (Jan 01, 
2009), http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/msg.html. 
8 Donald Rumsfeld, The QDR of 2001, info accessed via internet (Jan 
15, 2009), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf III-IV. 
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failed or failing states, transnational crime, humanitarian 
disasters or weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In fact, 
the strategic vision contained in the 2001 QDR appears very 
different from the reality of current conflict in the 21st 
century.  Within four years, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
would describe the oncoming series of campaigns against 
militant Islamic radical groups as “the long, hard slog 
ahead.”9  The 2006 QDR recognized the new threat environment 
and issued eight “Execution Roadmaps” to provide direction 
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Figure 1.   QDR to IW Roadmap Process11 
 
                     
9 Tom Donnelly, “Kill the QDR,” Armed Forces Journal, February 2006, 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813832.  
10 The 8 Executive Roadmaps include: Authorities, Tag, Track & 
Localize Threats, Building Partner Capacity, Strategic Communications, 
Joint Command & Control, DoD Institutional Reform and Governance, 
Sensor-based Management of the ISR Enterprise and Irregular Warfare. 
11 Greg Metzgar & Scott Sill, SOCJFCOM Irregular Warfare capabilities 
brief to Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, CMG DSO OBE, Deputy Commanding 
General Multi-National Force-Iraq, 07 July 2008, slide 3. 
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B. CREATION OF THE IW ROADMAP 
 Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed the 
classified “IW Execution Roadmap” on April 28, 2006.12  The 
IW Execution Roadmap is actually a collection of thirty-one 
actions, tasks and new milestones that articulates how DoD 
intends to improve its ability to conduct “long-duration 
operations, including unconventional warfare (UW), foreign 
internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), 
counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.”  “The roadmap itself lays out a 
plan of action,” said Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and one of the roadmap's 
principal authors.13 
 Unique to the several Roadmaps, including the IW 
Roadmap, DoD tasked both the individual Services and 
USSOCOM.  DoD recognized SOCOM’s singular comparative 
advantage at IW due to the fact most IW missions closely 
resemble several of USSOCOM’s primary mission competencies, 
including UW, FID, CT and COIN.  The IW Execution Roadmap’s 
overall suspense was the next fiscal year (2007), and 
required the Services and USSOCOM to develop action plans 
for implementation of the Roadmap directives.  Each 
identified IW task also required a separate “action memo” 
from the Joint Staff to detail how the separate services and 
USSOCOM would meet the requirements for each task. 
                     
12  This thesis discusses the unclassified sections of the IW 
Roadmap, allowing for greater distribution and audience.  It is the 
author’s opinion that omitting the classified parts of the IW Roadmap 
does not detract from the analysis or findings. 
13 Jason Sherman, “New Blueprint for Irregular Warfare,” 
Military.com, May 16, 2006, http://www.military.com/features/ 
0,15240,97301,00.html (accessed 24 October, 2007). 
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IW Roadmap section 2.6 (U) has nine subtasks for 
redesigning Joint and Service education and training.  
Within these nine subtasks, two tasks specifically address 
IW planner education.  IW Task 2.6.8 states, “The Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the 
Chiefs of the Military Services, will provide to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense by 30 June 2006 a plan to ensure that 
the DoD cadre of strategists and campaign planners are as 
competent at irregular warfare as conventional warfare.”14  
Task 2.6.9 (unclassified portions) directs the CJCS, United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and Service 
Chiefs to “provide to the Secretary of Defense by June 30, 
2006 a plan, for establishing, selecting, training, 
educating and developing a cadre of irregular warfare 
strategists and campaign planners to serve in joint and 
Service billets at national level and on combatant command 
and component staffs.”15 
 The IW Execution Roadmap also recognizes that there is 
no skill set identifier16 for IW planners.  While conducting 
research for this thesis, the author discovered even though 
each Service has a conventional operational strategist 
planner program, there is no shared joint designator across 
the Services to identify officers who have completed one of 
the advanced studies programs.  This is the case with all 
“conventional” focused Service campaign planner programs.  
                     
14 DoD, Office of the CJCS, Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap Task 
2.6.8, 16 February 2007, 1.   
15 Francisco H. Silebi, Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap Task 
2.6.9, 10 October 2007, 1.    
16 U.S. Army tracks the various skills and training Soldiers 
accomplish by assigning the designation of that skill a two-digit 
alphanumeric code for various skills, education or training which the 
Army service member has annotated on his official record. 
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Each Service does, however, track their own graduates.  The 
School of Advanced Studies (SAMS) at Ft. Leavenworth 
provides its graduates with the Army Career Field Functional 
Area 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy).  Graduates from the 
Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at National Defense 
University receive accreditation by the JS to fill billets 
at the Combatant Command and JS level as joint campaign 
planners and strategists.  The Navy Service recognizes 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) School of Advanced 
Warfighting (SAW) and Naval Operator’s Planning Course 
(NOPC) graduates as having the capabilities to design and 
manage warfare at the operational level.  There is no 
Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) for SAW or NOPC 
programs within the Navy.  Graduates of the Air Force’s 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) program are 
expert strategists on the art and science of aerospace 
warfare.  Although there is no single tracking mechanism or 
skill set identifier approved by the JS for these programs, 
each program’s reputation make their graduates highly sought 
after by GCCs and the JS.     
 SAMS graduates are known as the Army’s “Jedi-Knights,” 
because of the planning skills displayed during the first 
Gulf War.  The goal of tasks 2.6.8 and 2.6.9 is to replicate 
this same capability in irregular warfare planning and 
strategy.  
C. THE SERVICES PLAN TO MAKE IW STRATEGISTS AS COMPETENT 
AS CONVENTIONAL STRATEGISTS  
In response to IW Roadmap task 2.6.8, the Joint Staff 
declared:   
 13
The center of gravity for producing strategist 
and campaign planners is at the joint and service 
advanced course as follows: [Joint Advanced 
Warfighting School] JAWS, School of Advanced 
Military Studies (SAMS); School of Advanced 
Warfighting (SAW); School of Advanced Air and 
Space Studies (SAASS); Naval Operator’s Planner 
Course (NOPC); and the Naval Post Graduate School 
(NPS).17 
It requires a plan to ensure officers and enlisted 
service members throughout DoD serving in joint and service 
billets at the national level, on combatant commands and 
component staffs receive IW education and training.18  The 
Joint Staff recommended that advanced intermediary 
Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME) become the “center of gravity” for 
this education.19  They specified several advanced 
professional military education (PME) studies and Master’s 
degree curricula that would become the primary avenues 
schools for advanced IW education. 
To address IW Roadmap Task 2.6.8, action officers from 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), J-7 Operational Plans and 
Joint Force Development, Joint Education & Doctrine 
Division, assessed each of the Services and SOCOM.  They 
based their assessment on each Service providing a detailed 
description of the number of hours devoted to IW education 
within each of their PME programs.  Upon which, the Director 
of the Joint Staff compiled each of the Services and SOCOM’s 
individual plans for addressing the IW Execution Roadmap 
                     
17 Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 6, paragraph 6.3. 
18 Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, action memo, 16 
February 2007, coversheet bullet two. 
19 IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 3, paragraph 6.3. 
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Task 2.6.8 into one action memo.  The CJCS recommended this 
action memorandum for educating strategists and campaign 
planners for approval to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 
16 February 2007.  They stated, “Joint and Service colleges 
and schools are making excellent progress on updating and 
improving the IW content in curriculums and are 
mainstreaming IW in Joint Professional Military Education 
and Professional Military Education using existing funding 
to meet the requirements.”  Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Gordon England approved the CJSC’s action memorandum 
recommendation on March 3, 2007. 
Coordination and integration of programs to develop IW 
strategists and campaign planners into the Services’ PME 
systems are currently underway.  USSOCOM, consisting of 
JSOU, the Special Operations Knowledge and Futures Center 
(SOK-F), Air Force Special Operations School (AFSOS) and 
SOMDP integrate and share IW initiatives with the National 
Defense University (NDU).20 
A short explanation of each Services plan follows.  The 
Army will develop proficiency at IW campaign planning and 
COIN operations by implementing IW training into the United 
States Army War College (USAWC) three primary curriculums 
and FA 59 SAMS program.21  IW subjects will be included at 
all Command and General Staff College (CGSC) courses, 
Sergeants Major Academy, Battle Staff Non-Commissioned 
                     
20 NDU is primarily responsible to conduct intermediate and senior level 
joint education.  
21 USAWC curricula include the Joint Force Land Component Commander 
Course (JFLCC), United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute (PKSOI) and The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). 
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Officers (NCO) Course, Battle Command Training Program 
(BCTP), and Maneuver Combat Training Centers (MCTCs).22 
The Navy plan will develop and track with an Additional 
Qualification Designation (AQD) an elective track on 
insurgency / terrorism at the Naval War College (NWC).  They 
will increase IW subjects at NOPC, and leverage NPS’ Special 
Operations Masters Degree Program for additional IW 
expertise.  The United States Naval Academy (USNA) has 
established programs to enhance linguistic and cultural 
education recommendations made in the 2006 QDR.23 
The Air Force plan builds additional cultural, 
expeditionary and combat skills into the Officer Accession 
Training (OTS) and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).  
IW subjects are included in the Air and Space Basic Course, 
Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College 
courses, including SAASS advanced studies course.  The Air 
Force further leverages sister, joint and allied service 
schools; as well as includes IW instruction at the Air War 
College.24 
The Marine Corps plan leverages their current PME 
course of instruction to produce IW capable campaign 
planners.  IW and COIN subjects are an integral part of the 
curriculum at the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
program, Command and Staff College (CSC), SAW, and Marine 
Corps University (MCU).  The Marine Corps War College 
                     
22  Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 6, annex A Army Plan, 
A-1-A-6. 
23 Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 6, annex B Navy Plan, 
B-1-B-2. 
24 Ibid, annex C Air Force Plan, C-1-C-2. 
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(MCWAR) realigned their mission statement and curriculum to 
increase the importance of the study of IW.25  
 The Services are required to develop IW strategists 
based on their own assessments to address their own internal 
Service requirements.  The first requirement the Services 
assessed was to determine how much IW education needs 
incorporation into Service PME and JPME programs.  The CJCS 
provides additional guidance, known as Special Areas of 
Emphasis (SAEs), to Service and Joint PME programs.  
Colleges and schools evaluate the SAEs and incorporate the 
SAEs into their curricula; however, inclusion is not 
required, nor do the SAEs provide guidance on the number of 
hours a subject should have allotted.26  This decentralized 
approach allows the individual Services to conduct their own 
mission analysis and develop an appropriate level of IW 
instruction to met Service specific requirements.  It is the 
author’s opinion, based on research done for this thesis, 
that any educational assessment from the JS tasking the 
Services to determine their own requirements, followed by 
self-enforcement of these requirements by the Services, may 
not result in a very rigorous analysis or strenuous 
enforcement of the original JS tasking.  The tasking is 
equivalent to allowing the fox to determine the requirements 
for guarding the hen house.      
To answer IW Roadmap task 2.6.9 for how USSOCOM in 
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
                     
25 Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 6, annex D Marine 
Corps Plan, D-1-D-3. 
26 Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, action memo, 16 
February 2007, 3, paragraph 5.6-6.1, derived from CJCSI 1800.01C, 
December 2005, Officer Professional Development Policy. 
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Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
CJCS, and Services accomplish developing a cadre of IW 
strategists and planners, there are two parts, internal to 
USSOCOM and external Service programs.  USSOCOM developed a 
plan to utilize their current educational structures to 
create IW strategists among Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
to fulfill USSOCOM’s unique IW requirements.  Chapter III 
details how USSOCOM leverages both the initiatives of the 
Services’ advanced studies programs and its own JSOU, AFSOS 
and SOMDP to provide a detailed account of USSOCOM’s 
response to the IW education tasks.  
 18
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III. THE USSOCOM APPROACH TO IW EDUCATION 
A. WHY TASK A UNIFIED COMMAND TO PROVIDE IW EDUCATION? 
 While the Secretary of Defense, through the IW 
Execution Roadmap, required all Services to provide IW 
education, he also tasked USSOCOM to create a plan for IW 
education.  Since its inception on November 14, 1986, 
USSOCOM has occupied a unique position in DoD.  Unlike the 
geographical combatant commands (GCCs), who are responsible 
for certain geographical areas, USSOCOM serves instead as a 
unified command with worldwide responsibilities for special 
operations (SO) and serves as the global synchronizer within 
DoD for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  USSOCOM also 
has service-like responsibilities via Major Force Programs 
(MFP) 11 funding authorities.  These MFP 11 authorities 
include controlling its own budgets, research/development 
staffs, training, education and force provider 
responsibilities that are more akin to Service authorities 
and responsibilities.   After September 11, 2001, Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld asserted:  
Responsibility for the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) campaign plan is vested in SOCOM.  
Responsibility for theater GWOT strategy is the 
responsibility of the Geographical Combatant 
Commanders. . . SOCOM has been designated as the 
supported command to plan, synchronize and when 
directed, execute GWOT strategies and 
operations.27 
                     
27 Michael Vickers, Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming 
Interagency Problems, Testimony before the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 15 April 2006, 
http://csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20060315.ImplementingGW
OT/T.20060315.ImplementingGWOT.pdf, (accessed 25 November 2007). 
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This new requirement reinforces some of USSOCOM’s 
oldest missions; the broader mission set of IW includes 
conducting Psychological Operations (PSYOP), COIN, UW and 
FID.  After 9/11, the initial USSOCOM strategy was direct 
action.  After almost eight years of constant combat DoD and 
USSOCOM have realized they must shift emphasis away from the 
high-profile raids that were the hallmark of the early years 
of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts.  The kill/capture 
requirement is necessary; however, this is often short 
sighted and counterproductive, angering locals while 
undermining domestic leaders.  The indirect strategy, 
contained within USSOCOM’s 2007 posture statement, consists 
of three lines of operation: enabling foreign partners, 
deterring support to terrorists and eroding extremist 
ideologies.28  The ability to prepare SOF officers to engage 
in the indirect approach goes hand in hand with QDR task 
2.6.9 (U), the creation of IW strategists and campaign 
planners. 
The CJCS tasked USSOCOM to create IW strategists on par 
with conventional planners and create an education program 
of instruction to produce IW strategists/planners.29  As 
explained earlier, USSOCOM’s unique role in the GWOT 
required an equally unique response, separate from the 
Services.  The USSOCOM J-9 staff created two working groups 
– one for each Roadmap educational task.  In turn, each 
reported to the same “steering committee,” chaired by the  
 
                     
28 USSOCOM 2007 Posture Statement, 4, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2007.pdf, (accessed 26 
April, 2009). 
29 CJCS Memo requiring SOCOM and the Services for input on their 
individual plans to answer QDR Task 2.6.9 (U). 
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Deputy Commander, USSOCOM.  The Commanding General USSOCOM 
had final approval.  This chapter analyzes the two action 
plans.  
B. USSOCOM’S PLAN TO EDUCATE IW STRATEGISTS (TASK 2.6.8) 
On January 11, 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
received USSOCOM’s signed response to the IW Execution 
Roadmap.  USSOCOM’s action plan, contained in the JS 
response to QDR task 2.6.8, provides USSOCOM’s vision of a 
new training program of instruction.  The responsive agent 
for USSOCOM on matters relating to IW education is the 
Special Operations Knowledge and Futures (SOKF) Center.30  
USSOCOM’s response to task 2.6.8 is a combination of new 
initiatives and previously existing educational 
opportunities for SOF.  These opportunities are a 
combination of seminars offered at the Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU) and the Air Force Special 
Operations School, the Special Operations Master Degree 
Program (SOMDP) at NPS and computer based training available 
on the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) and Defense Knowledge 
Online (DKO) web sites. 
 USSOCOM’s response to Task 2.6.8 leverages individual 
web-based learning and additional IW related subjects in 
military advanced education and civilian advanced education 
curricula.  External to USSOCOM the action plan leverages 
each Services’ Intermediate Level Education (ILE) advanced 
studies programs.  Each Services’ advanced studies programs  
                     
30 Boyd L. Ballard, E-mail message to author, November 25, 2008. Mr. 
Ballard works in USSOCOM SOKF-J7 Education Branch.  SOKF has personnel 
within USSOCOM’s J7, J9, J10 and JSOU ensuring integration, coordination 
and shared oversight of educational and training programs between 
USSOCOM, Services and Combatant Commands. 
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offer an opportunity to complete a master’s degree and 
receive credit for Joint Professional Military Education I 
(JPME I).  However, in terms of civilian advanced education 
curricula (master’s degree programs pursued in conjunction 
with advanced studies programs) only SOMDP at NPS combines 
JPME I credit with an IW focused master degree.  
 USSOCOM fosters collaboration in IW education with the 
Services in two ways.  Coordination and integration of 
programs to develop IW strategists and campaign planners 
into the Services’ PME systems are currently underway.  One 
example is USSOCOM, consisting of JSOU, the Special 
Operations Knowledge and Futures Center (SOKF), AFSOS and 
NPS integrate and share IW initiatives with the National 
Defense University (NDU).31  The second collaborative effort 
is USSOCOM’s creation of an operational concept for 
education, which consists of three parts, “Education, 
Influence and Inform.”  Education initiatives consist of 
assisting and supporting the Services in the development of 
professional military education requirements for the future.  
Included within the education strategy is the coordination 
of limited IW resources, deconfliction of IW doctrine 
between conventional and SOF missions and providing a forum 
to discuss education proponency issues.  USSOCOM in 
conjunction with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has 
created the Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC).  The 
center provides a conduit between the Services and USSOCOM 
to initiate actions to ensure the proper resourcing of IW 
requirements against the challenges of implementing IW in 
DoD.  USSOCOM addresses Influence initiatives through DoD IW 
                     
31 NDU is primarily responsible to conduct intermediate and senior level 
joint education.  
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JOC process and the IW Execution Roadmap.  USSOCOM will 
Inform (share) all aspects of IW development, implementation 
and best practices with the IW community of interest (COI) 
through aggressive and transparent collaboration across the 
Services.32  USSOCOM utilizes its Special Operations Support 
Team (SOST) offices to ensure the Interagency Partnership 
Program (IPP) members remain aware of IW related issues 
requiring interagency (IA) support and coordination.  
 Task 2.6.9(U) requires a different focus.  In answering 
the requirement to develop a cadre of SOF strategists and 
campaign planners USSOCOM built its own internal program, 
rather than rely on the Services PME programs.   
C. USSOCOM’S THREE TIERED PROGRAM FOR TASK 2.6.9(U)  
According to the scope of task 2.6.9(U), 
The plan for developing a cadre of SOF 
strategists and campaign planners must account 
for current capabilities, defined operational 
requirements, established education curriculum, 
required training development, and future 
campaign planning and strategy development, and 
the growth of General Purpose Forces (GPF) 
capabilities to support IW.33 
                     
32 Colonel Joseph Osborne, SOCOM J-10, Irregular Warfare Brief, 
Operational Concept definitions, slide 8, October 10, 2007. 
33 Department of Defense SOCOM, Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9 (U), 2, 

















*  SOF and SOF enablers
** NPS program currently funded   
Figure 2.   SOF IW Strategist/Campaign Planner Education 
Concept34 
The USSOCOM plan to create SOF Strategist/Campaign 
Planners consists of three phases: Phase one, a Joint 
Special Operations Warfighter Certificate (JSOWC); Phase 
two, SOF Strategist and Campaign Planner PME-Supported 
Education; and Phase three, SOF Strategist and Campaign 
Planner Advanced Education.  The USSOCOM methodology focuses 
on the individual through all three levels of training, with 
the ultimate goal of creating a fully qualified SOF 
strategist / campaign planner.  In comparison, the Services 
training methodology consists of a building block approach 
to training, with the goal of preparing a unit for combat 
readiness.  
JSOU’s Phase one begins the process of IW education by 
establishing a foundation for subsequent phases.    
                     
34 SOCOM’s Response to IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.9, 4, Figure 6–1 
(SOF Strategist/Campaign Planner Education Concept). 
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Phase 1 is the baseline level of education and 
training.  The focus of this phase is to prepare 
core SOF and SOF enablers at the mid-level (0-3 
and 0-4, E-5 to E-8; W2-W4) and interagency 
personnel for the concept, capabilities and 
growth of IW prior to assignment in a joint 
billet.  Phase 1 will be managed and developed by 
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), 
consisting of current lessons/courses and 
provides a robust SOF/IW curricula.  Since 
personnel background is varied, JSOU will review 
requests from personnel for constructive credit 
of this phase based on prior experience and 
completed courses.  JSOU will organize lessons 
into a foundational course that awards a SOF/IW 
“certificate,” a guarantee of competency in 
selected IW/SOF topics.  To facilitate completion 
and participation of Phase 1, lessons will be 
modularized for flexible attendance policy, 
include a distance learning component (VTI + web) 
and stress a broad knowledge of SOF/IW with 
emphasis on synchronization and 
interoperability.35 
In February 2007, JSOU implemented the Joint Special 
Operations Warfighter Certificate (JSOWC) as the Baseline 
Education; the training consists of three modules: Strategic 
Thinking for Special Operations Forces Planners Course, 
Irregular Warfare Course and Joint Special Operations 
Collaborative Planning Course.36  Each module is two weeks 
in length and offered twice a year at JSOU’s Hurlburt Field, 
Florida Campus.  Prior to arrival at Hurlburt Field, a 
prospective student must complete selected readings, a 
                     
35 Department of Defense, Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9 (U), 4, 
paragraph 6-2. 
36 John S. Prairie, “Joint special operations warfighter 
certificate,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Dec 2007. Info accessed via web 
(08 December 2008), 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOKNN/is_/ai_n28028060.  
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lessons-learned familiarization with DoD Joint pubs, several 
web-based courses, and a pre-test.   
Phase two combines ILE instruction conducted by the 
Services with USSOCOM-approved SOF specific blocks of 
instruction. 
Phase 2 is the intermediate level of SOF 
strategist and planner education and training.  
Completion of JSOWC is required, and can be 
completed independently of Phase 2.  Since Phase 
2 relies on implementation of QDR IW task 2.6.8 
into the Services’ PMEs, development of IW 
learning objectives may require the placement of 
an MFP-11 funded SOF Chair at senior and 
intermediate level PME schools and coordination 
with the Joint Staff and Service PMEs.  JSOU will 
assist (as required) in the development of core 
curriculum, academic exercises, wargame support 
and scenario development.  Additionally, JSOU 
will develop exportable blocks of instruction for 
JPME using the curricula from Phase 1.  These 
blocks of instruction will be available to all 
Service PMEs and interagencies; can be adjusted 
for desired cognitive level of learning and focus 
both on SOF and GPF roles in IW.37 
USSOCOM’s vision for Phase three, Advanced Education is to 
send the best and brightest SOF and SOF enabler students to 
NPS’ SOMDP.  Using a curriculum that focuses on IW, USSOCOM 
will educate selected individuals as SOF Strategists / 
Campaign Planners.  
[The goal] is to build upon the foundational 
lessons in Phase 1 and Phase 2 by providing a 
deeper understanding and more thorough 
investigation of specific IW topics and activity 
areas.  Currently SOF and SOF enablers are able 
to complete Phase 3 through a Masters program, 
funded by USSOCOM at NPS.  In order to support 
                     
37 SOCOM Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9 (U), 5, paragraph 6-3. 
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additional requirements, USSOCOM, in coordination 
with JSOU, will build partnerships with key 
advanced studies programs to provide substantial 
blocks of IW instruction (SAMS, JAWS, etc).  
Through these partnerships, USSOCOM will continue 
to inject SOF content in modified IW curricula, 
ensuring [IW related subject] currency.38   
Once an individual completes all three phases, USSOCOM 
recognizes them as subject matter experts at IW.  USSOCOM is 
also developing a tracking mechanism with the Services’ 
respective branch managers and detailers.  This will enhance 
placement of fully qualified USSOCOM IW planners to critical 
billets.  Clearly, USSOCOM recognizes the value of SAMS and 
the other advanced ILE courses by including them as 
qualifiers for SOF Strategist / Campaign Planner 
accreditation.  Although SAMS currently includes 320 hours 
of “IW related instruction,”39 its use as a case study in 
this thesis is based on their ability to produce 
conventional operational planners. 
D. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS MASTERS DEGREE PROGRAM AT NPS  
 In 1992, long before the QDR required the Services to 
focus on IW education, forward thinking Special Operations 
officers and NPS professors recognized the need to provide 
specialized instruction on IW related subjects.  The current 
SOMDP curriculum has nine “tracks”.  Each track allows for 
further specialization and concentration. 
The [SOMDP] curriculum provides a focused course 
of instruction in irregular warfare, sub-state 
                     
38 SOCOM Plan of Action QDR Task 2.6.9 (U), 5, paragraph 6-4. 
39 Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff action memo, IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8 Plan, Key Advanced 
Course and NPS Program Statistics, (U.S. Department of Defense, 
Washington, D.C., 16 February 2008), 9. 
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conflict, terrorism and counterterrorism, and 
other "high leverage" operations in U.S. defense 
and foreign policy.  The core program also 
provides every student with a strong background 
in strategic analysis, decision modeling, 
organization theory, and formal analytical 
methods.  The student's program is built around a 
common set of core courses and a selected 
specialty track.  Currently the [specialty] 
tracks offered are: Irregular Warfare, 
Information Operations, Terrorist Operations and 
Financing, Operations Analysis, Combat Systems, 
Financial Management, C4I Systems, National 
Security Affairs (Stability / Reconstruction), 
and National Security Affairs (Regional Studies).  
The individual student, depending on his or her 
interests and academic background, chooses the 
specialty track.40  
Currently, SOMDP requires 18 months of in-depth study 
culminating with an approved thesis.  Those who complete the 
program receive a Master of Science Degree in Defense 
Analysis, with the selected specialty track emphasized in 
parentheses.  The program is open to all services, 
interagency partners, and international officers.  
NPS and USSOCOM are uniquely postured to provide a 
curriculum completely devoted to IW.  The final Joint Staff 
response to the IW Execution Roadmap notes that the SOMDP is 
capable of  
[the] development of strategists and campaign 
planners competent in IW.  These courses produce 
graduates who can create campaign quality 
concepts, plan for the employment of all elements 
of national power, and succeed as 
operational/strategic planners.  These creative,  
 
                     
40 Navy Postgraduate School, General Catalog 2008, Department of 
Defense Analysis, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GeneralCatalog/Home.htm, 
(accessed 05 July 2008). 
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conceptual, adaptive and innovative planners are 
valuable service combatant command and Joint Staff 
assets.41   
Within their response, the Joint Staff recognized USSOCOM’s 
portion of the IW Education Final Plan as equivalent to the 
Services’ intermediate level programs.  In their assessment, 
the JS stated, [SOMDP’s] comparative advantage is that its’ 
curriculum is built around teaching students “how to think,” 
while focusing on IW related subjects.  The completion of 
Phase two and three “qualifies personnel as Master 
Equivalent Level SOF Strategist/Planner."42  
 Besides SOMDP the Phase Three plan also has additional 
support requirements to coordinate with JSOU to build 
partnerships with key advanced studies programs to provide 
substantial blocks of IW instruction.  These partnerships 
will require the placement of SOF chairs at each of the 
Services’ advanced education institutions, as well as 
memorandums of understanding / memorandums of agreement 
(MOU/MOA) between the commands.  Through these partnerships 
and SOF chairs, USSOCOM will be able to inject SOF content 
in modified IW curricula, ensuring currency.43   
E. “CENTERS OF GRAVITY” FOR IW EDUCATION 
 The “center of gravity,” as stated previously, for 
producing strategists and campaign planners is at Joint and 
Services advanced courses, advanced studies programs and 
programs like NPS’s SOMDP.  USSOCOM’s response IW Execution 
                     
41 JS response, Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, 10-11, 
paragraph 7.1.1. 
42 JS response, Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.9(U), 5, 
paragraph 6-4. 
43 Ibid, 5, paragraph 6-4.  
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Roadmap Task 2.6.9(U) built an original three-Phase 
education concept, with the third phase of USSOCOM IW 
education provided at SOMDP, SAMS, SAASS, SAW, JAWS and 
NOPC.44  As of February 17, 2007, the current advanced 
studies schools (JAWS, SAMS, SAW, SAASS and NOPC) all have 
between twenty-five and fifty percent of their curricula as 
containing “IW related subjects.”45  SOMDP has almost three 
times more curriculum hours (924 to SAW’s 394) and was at 
least five months longer then any other program (SOMDP 18 
months, NOPC 13 months).46  USSOCOM’s SOF Strategist / 
Campaign Planner accreditation requires completion of Phases 
two and three.  Within USSOCOM this qualifies the personnel 
as a master equivalent level SOF strategist/planner.  At 
this time, institutionalizing and tracking this 
“accreditation” process by the Services has not been 
resolved.  USSOCOM and NPS inform U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command (HRC), Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Branch 
Managers whom among their officer population have completed 
SOMDP.  Branch Managers attempt to place SOMDP graduates 
into SOF operational planning billets.47  However, this is 
not a requirement and Branch Managers often fill operational 
requirements with SOMDP graduates first, verse an assignment 
based on their IW planning capability. 
                     
44 The advanced studies programs USSOCOM is sending SOF personnel to 
attend are detailed in the Services response to IW Roadmap task 2.6.8 in 
chapter two.   
45 Final Plan IW Execution Roadmap Task 2.6.8, chart titled “Key 
Advanced Course and NPS Program Statistics”, 9. 
46 Ibid. 9.   
47 Numerous conversations and e-mails between author and USA Branch 
Managers for 18(SF), 37(PO) and 38(CA) between October 2007 and June 
2008.  
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 Where can USSOCOM look for help in developing their IW 
campaign strategist / planner program? 
F. SEARCHING FOR A SUCCESSFUL MODEL FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING 
 What should SOCOM’s IW strategist education look like?  
USSOCOM’s creation of a three-tiered education concept is 
not the only form of campaign planner education found within 
the DoD.  Is it possible to improve the current process by 
creating a hybrid education process that utilizes the “best 
practices” of several systems? 
For the purposes of this thesis, the author uses the 
SAMS program as a case study for analysis.  SAMS is chosen 
because SAMS’ graduates are highly valued by GCCs, and they 
have a proven record.  Chapter IV examines three distinct 
parts (educational environment, teaching methodology and 
curriculum) of SAMS worthy for consideration as potential 
















































IV. CASE STUDY: SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES 
SAMS’ AMSP exemplifies a flexible educational program.  
In the early eighties, senior Army officers recognized a 
“perceived gap between the levels of officer competence they 
observed and the level they would be comfortable going to  
to public attention during the first Gulf War, it is 
renowned for its advanced conventional operational planner 
education.  SAMS’ design focuses on the three major elements 
of education: the educational environment, teaching 
methodology, and the curriculum to maximize the professional 
output needed by the Army.  These aspects of the SAMS 
program are important considerations in the development or 
revision of any IW planner education program.   
A. HISTORY OF SAMS 
Created in 1982, the SAMS’ mission is “to educate 
officers at the graduate level in military art and science 
to produce leaders with the mental flexibility to solve 
complex problems in peace, conflict, and war.”  SAMS is 
actually a reincarnation of an Army program that existed 
during the early 20th century.  Both the previous and 
current programs provide a second year of intermediate level 
professional military education for selected graduates of 
the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC).48   
                     
48 Huba Wass de Czege, Final Report F-2-F-3.  Command and General 
Staff College is the formal name of the Ft. Leavenworth schoolhouse, 
which controls several curricula.  Before the creation of Intermediate 
Level Education (ILE), Army Officers were required to complete CGSOC 
prior to competing for promotion to LTC.  Reservist must complete CGSOC 
through at least Phase II for promotion consideration to LTC.  ILE and 
the Advanced Operations Warfighting Course (AOWC) replaced the CGSOC 
curriculum.    
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Manpower needs, projected by the U.S. War Department 
prior to World War II, made it impossible to remove officers 
from the force for two years of training.  This effectively 
ended the SAMS program in 1941.  The graduate-level 
education program resumed after several post-Vietnam era 
studies identified shortcomings in the intermediate level 
officer education and training programs.  These studies 
included the Officer Personnel Management System, Review of 
Education and Training of Officers (RETO report of 1978) and 
the Strategic Studies Institute’s “Operational Planning: An 
Analysis of the Professional Military Education and 
Development of Effective Army Planners” (1982).49  BG(R) 
Huba Wass de Czege spearheaded the creation of SAMS to 
address the shortcomings that these reports noted among the 
Army’s mid-level officers.  SAMS began as a pilot program in 
1982 and was formally approved in 1984.50 
The current SAMS’ program consists of two components:  
the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF), and 
the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP).  The focus of 
this case study is the AMSP course, commonly referred to as 
SAMS.  This is a bit of a misnomer as AMSP and AOASF are two 
courses within the SAMS program.  AMSP is designed for 
branch-qualified captains or higher with less then fourteen 
                     
49 As the Army rebuilt itself following the Vietnam conflict, several 
studies (OPMS, RETO, SSI Report) identified shortcomings in the 
intermediate level officer education and training programs.  These 
reports recommended reinstituting “Leavenworth’s 2 year men” education 
program.  The reports clearly identified the critical number of World 
War II generals who had attended Leavenworth’s program and their impact 
on the force during World War II. 
50 John L. Gifford, Teaching and Learning the Operational Art of War: 
An Appraisal of the School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kans.: United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2000), 6.  
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years active federal commissioned service.  The AOASF 
program is an Army War College equivalent course, admitting 
lieutenant colonels and colonels.  AOASF is part of AMSP’s 
faculty development.  Both have elements applicable to the 
design of an IW educational program. 
B. EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The first element stressed by SAMS is the educational 
environment.  Creating an effective learning environment is 
an essential part of any educational program or institution.  
An educational environment consists of the faculty and the 
students.   
1. Student Selection 
The caliber of the student population has a direct 
effect on the outcome of training devoted to individual and 
group development.  Thus, the creators of the current SAMS’ 
program established a selection process for enrollment.  
Perspective applicants must volunteer for the program.  The 
volunteer completes the JPME I program (service specific 
example being the CGSOC’s Intermediate Level Education / 
Advanced Officer Warfighter Course (ILE / AOWC)).  
Volunteers must receive a recommendation from their chain of 
command, take the Nelson-Denney reading comprehension test, 
and complete a written examination that measures military 
knowledge, tactical reasoning, and written communication 
skills.  The SAMS candidate must also write several short 
essays that answer questions from the admissions board, and 
pass an oral interview with the Director of SAMS.  A board 
consisting of JPME department directors then votes on each 
applicant’s file.  The board creates an order of merit list, 
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and each fiscal year, approximately ninety students 
matriculate.  Even with the increased stress of ongoing 
operational requirements, enrollment has not dropped below 
seventy-eight since 2001.51 
2. Faculty 
Each SAMS Small Group Seminar (SGS) classroom consists 
of no more then fifteen students and three instructors.  The 
SAMS’ faculty consists of one civilian Ph.D. professor, one 
primary small group instructor (Lieutenant Colonel), one 
assistant instructor (Colonel), who is an operational 
subject matter expert (SME) in their second year of the U.S. 
Army War College’s Advanced Operational Arts Studies 
Fellowship (AOASF) program.   
The AOASF program annually enrolls up to eight U.S. 
Army and Marine Corps colonels and lieutenant colonels for 
focused study on the skills and knowledge required for 
strategic and operational campaign planning in and between 
theaters of war across the entire spectrum of conflict.  
Subsequent assignment upon completion of their fellowship 
will be as theater level planners.  The AOASF Fellows in 
their first year engage in study consisting of classroom 
investigation of multinational, joint and interagency 
environment, extensive travel to DoD regional commands and 
headquarters around the world.  Second year fellows serve as 
instructors in the AMSP seminars alongside PhDs from the 
                     
51 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Self-Study Report, 
submitted to the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central 
Association of Colleges and Schools, December 2005, 75.  
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resident SAMS faculty.52Using this combination of theory and 
experience, the SAMS’ program ensures outstanding training 
of its next class of conventional operational planners.   
C. TEACHING METHODOLOGY  
The second element is the teaching methodology.  SAMS 
uses outcome-based education (OBE), which is a student-
centered learning philosophy that focuses on empirically 
measuring student performance.  It requires that students 
demonstrate that they have learned the required skills and 
content.  In practice, OBE generally promotes curricula and 
assessment based on constructivist methods (gaining 
knowledge and meaning from experiences) and discourages 
traditional education approaches based on direct instruction 
of facts and standard methods.53  SAMS utilizes small-group 
interaction in lieu of didactic instruction (teaching from 
textbooks rather than demonstration and hand-on application) 
for many of its courses.  There are only eleven to thirteen 
students in each small group seminar.  The seminar leader 
facilitates dialogue between the students to induce student 
discovery.  Professors avoid using lectures as a teaching 
method in the seminar rooms.  Very few lesson plans require 
the use of auditoriums for group lectures or guest speakers 
during the school calendar.  Besides small group discussion 
and lecture, exercise programs reinforce the classroom 
discussion.  The exercises and simulations utilize the 
“reflective practitioner” model to complement classroom 
                     
52 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Self-Study Report, 
submitted to the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central 
Association of Colleges and Schools, December 2005, 30. 
53 Outcome Based Education, assessed via web 20 January 2008, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outcome-based_education.  
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learning.  These exercise programs allow students the 
opportunity to place theory into practice using simulations 
and role-playing exercises.  Donald Schon developed the 
theory of “reflective practitioner” to explain how 
professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and architects 
transfer learned theory into practice.  In his book The 
Reflective Practitioner, Schon discusses ways in which 
education can prepare practitioners to solve clean, 
rational, scientific-technical type problems using practice-
based theory.54  The faculty at SAMS utilizes the techniques 
documented in Schon’s study.  SAMS students improve their 
craft through individual discovery learning (reflective 
learning), which is then coupled with practical exercises 
(practitioner learning).  The result is a student who can 
take theory and apply it in practical application.    
D. CURRICULUM 
Lastly, the curriculum is the final product of the SAMS 
system.  SAMS is part of the Army Service’s Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) accreditation system.  
Under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, 
Congress directed the Services to implement mandatory JPME 
education, training and joint billet assignments in order to 
facilitate better inter-service operability.  However, the 
Act did not stipulate precise cross-service training 
requirements, instead allowing the services and Combatant 
Commanders to establish their own training requirements.  
The SAMS’ organizes its POI the following way. 
                     
54 Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals 
Think in Action, Basic Books, New York, 1983.   
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The curriculum consists of three trimesters, each 
with a distinct focus.  The first trimester 
emphasizes the study of military theory, history, 
and doctrine.  The second concentrates on 
“leading change” and explores new concepts of 
modular organization and execution within the 
Army.  During the third trimester, students are 
allowed to select an area for focused study, 
reinforced by participation in practical staff 
exercises.55 
SAMS utilizes the United States Army Training and 
Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) approved lesson plan format in 
both the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and the 
Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF).  This 
format provides standardized instruction for military 
personnel throughout the Army, and requires that all Army 
service instructors (including those at the Special Warfare 
Center) must graduate from the TRADOC-approved Instructor 
Training Course (ITC). 
 By focusing on not only the curriculum, but also the 
faculty and teaching method, SAMS has created an effective 
program of instruction for operational conventional 
planners.  The program not only offers premium education, 
but the flexibility to adapt itself to the requirements of 
twenty-first century forms of warfare.  Comparing and 
contrasting SOCOM’s proposed program for IW education with 
the SAMS’ conventional planner system allows one to evaluate 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF USSOCOM’S IW EDUCATION 
PROPOSAL TO SAMS CONVENTIONAL PLANNER EDUCATION 
 The basis for SAMS’ evaluation is solely on how well it 
teaches conventional campaign planning.  Although the 
USSOCOM approach is a three-tiered process, the actual 
comparison within this thesis is only between SAMS and 
SOMDP.  This chapter contains three sub-sections.  Each sub-
section lists the comparative subject and then addresses 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  Each sub-section 
concludes with a determination of which system is better and 
why.  Finally, the author will attempt to develop a hybrid 
of the two approaches, maximizing each comparative 
advantage. 
A. COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
1. Student Selection  
The JSOU 3 tier IW Education process does not use 
student selection for the first and second phase of 
education.  For officers wishing to attend the SOMDP (Phase 
Three), there is a selection process.  Every January a 
selection board composed of the Army Special Operations 
Forces (ARSOF) Group at HRC,56 the Director of the United 
States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
(USAJFCSWC) and the Directorate of Army Special Operations 
Proponency, convenes to review the files of potential 
candidates.  Officers who desire to attend NPS must submit 
                     
56 HRC ARSOF Group composed of branch mangers for SF, PSYOP, CA, and 
includes files for officers serving in Ranger units, special operations 
aviation and special mission units. 
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documentation, including Graduate Record Exam (GRE) results, 
to their respective branch managers57. 
Perspective SAMS students must apply through the 
President’s Board of CGSC for recommendation to attend the 
program.  Included with their application are the results of 
several general knowledge tests, a pre-exam to determine the 
level of proficiency they acquired during ILE and AOWC, a 
writing proficiency essay and a personality exam.  However, 
there is no graduate entrance exam requirement for SAMS. 
All professional graduate level institutions use the 
GRE to test applicants’ scholastic aptitude.  This test is 
the benchmark nation-wide for graduate student’s entrance 
into any civilian institution of higher learning.  Arguably, 
the SAMS student selection criteria may distill the best 
military officer among applicants, but it does little to 
determine the best academician.  Both CGSC and NPS are 
looking for the Services best officers to attend their 
respective programs.  The goal of each institutions approach 
to determining student selection is to bring the most 
competitive student from the Services into their respective 
programs.  The fact that NPS uses GRE to measure potential 
student aptitude, and SAMS created its own approach, 
demonstrates little difference in the quality level of the 
students attending either SAMS or SOMDP.  Both approaches 
bring top quality applicants into their programs, making 
them even for the sub-section of student quality. 
                     
57 There is no selection criteria for students to attend Phase one or Phase 
two.  Any service member can apply to USSOCOM’s Phase One Special Operations 
Warfighter Certification modules taught at JSOU.  The majority of officers of 
the rank 0-4 attend one of the Services ILE PME schools.  Phase two relies on 
implementation of QDR task 2.6.8 (SOF chairs facilitating additional IW blocks 
of instruction) into Services ILE programs. 
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Although not a strong enough criterion to be a 
discriminator, due to the fact SAMS is Service-centric, the 
Army has the ability to track student graduates through the 
designation of an additional skill identifier (ASI).  This 
warrants discussion, as there are joint professional 
military education (PME) schools, such as courses at the 
Joint Forces Staff College, or any of the Services War 
Colleges, accredited and tracked by the other Services. 
As of yet, USSOCOM has no official method of tracking, 
through skill identifiers or other means, students who have 
completed JSOU electives or SOMDP with the Services.58  This 
is due to the fact USSOCOM has very few Service approved 
“accredited” courses it can assign a recognized tracking 
code.  One example of USSOCOM accreditation is the ability 
to teach ILE at NPS’s SOMDP.  USSOCOM has “service-like” 
authorities, but lacks sole proponency for IW across DoD to 
grant a skill identifier for an individual whom SOCOM 
trains/educates as a SOF IW Campaign Strategist / Planner.  
If the Joint Staff accredits USSOCOM’s SOF IW Campaign 
Strategist / Planner approach, then the Services could agree 
upon a uniform additional skill identifier or designate 
their own.59  As an example, the National Defense University 
may grant JPME II accreditation to any student who completes 
the course requirements at the Joint Forces Staff College’s 
Joint and Combined Staff Officer School. 
                     
58 Jim Sykes, and Ken Cobb, E-mail and phone conversations with 
author, 8-9 December 2008, Colonel Sykes is the current SOF chair at 
JSOU, Mr. Kenny Cobb is a government contractor working as an instructor 
at JSOU. 
59 E-mail and phone conversations between author and Ken Cobb, 8-9 
December 2008. 
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SAMS is a Service run school and the Army has 
proponency over the education and training through Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  This allows Ft. 
Leavenworth’s CGSG to assign the skill identified (59) to 
graduates of SAMS AMSP.  Recognized throughout the Army, the 
skill identifier 59 is tracked by U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command (HRC) in each Soldier’s official military record.  
Sister Services have recognized the quality training the 
Army is offering and have agreements with the Army to 
recognize the completion of AMSP as the equivalent of a 
Service operational planner. 
All Services, assign their SAMS graduates to 
operational campaign planner slots on Joint Commands and 
Service Headquarters Staffs.  The Army Service grants a 
skill identifier of (59) for Army personnel.  Yet, USSOCOM 
does not have authority to designate an ASI for completion 
of the three tiered SOF IW Strategist / Planner education.  
SAMS clearly is ahead of USSOCOM in its method of tracking 
students.  USSOCOM has additional structural barriers 
outlined above to overcome. 
2. Faculty 
Nineteen of the twenty-one professors (ninety percent) 
at NPS’s Defense Analysis Department, responsible for the 
SOMDP, have PhD’s.60  The faculty includes anthropologists, 
theologians, political scientists, historians, 
mathematicians, and social scientists. As eclectic as the 
faculty is, the common denominator is a focus on terrorism 
                     
60 NPS Department of Defense Analysis Senior Lecturer and Associate 
Chair for Operations Pete Gustaitis, interview by author, Monterey, CA., 
26 November 2007. 
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and unconventional warfare.  Their degrees are from very 
prestigious academic institutions such as Stanford, Johns 
Hopkins, Columbia University, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Harvard, Berkley and University of Chicago. 
Over seventy-five percent of the resident teaching 
faculty at SAMS/AMSP holds PhDs.  All of the active duty 
officer instructors have master’s degrees; the majority of 
these degrees earned as students while attending 
SAMS/AMSP.61  This reinforces their expertise at 
conventional planning but limits their potential exposure to 
other academic forms of learning.  Students and instructors 
become “masters” of Fort Leavenworth’s CGSC education 
system.  Militarily that can be reinforcing; yet it is the 
author’s opinion that academically, it is quite limited at 
teaching students “how to think.” 
Diversity of subject matter expertise and higher 
percentage of PhD’s among the faculty makes the SOMDP 
faculty ideal for irregular warfare education.   
B. COMPARISON OF TEACHING METHODS 
1. USSOCOM 
SOMDP professors use seminar style, learner-centric 
interactive classroom instruction.  Several of the classes 
that teach students “how to think” use the Socratic 
                     
61 Completion of SAMS AMSP program result in a Master of Military 
Arts and Science granted by Ft. Leavenworth’s CGSC under approval of the 
North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, Accessed via web 13 
December 2008, http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/contentdm/sams.htm. 
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Method.62  NPS enforces attendance strictly, as presence in 
the classroom is equivalent to “present for duty.”  All 
instruction is face to face between students and professors.  
This is an important distinction to make in the era of web-
based, multi media distance learning and video tele-
instruction.  It is the author’s opinion that these are just 
high technology band-aids for the student and teacher being 
together in a classroom or laboratory.  Part of SOMDP 
teaching method is to improve students’ professional writing 
capability by having them write articles for publication in 
periodicals.  Although the only graduation requirement for 
publication is the students’ thesis, several professors at 
NPS grade written work based on its potential for 
publication.  SOMDP averages between twenty-five to forty 
students in a few core courses.  The electives average 
between as little as ten and no more then twenty-five 
students.  USSOCOM has authorized the DA Department to hire 
at least two additional instructors to offset increased 
student population.  
2. SAMS 
SAMS employs several teaching methods all re-enforcing 
adaptive learning methodology through verbal, written and 
“reflective practitioner” (hand-on) interaction.  Since 
1982, CGSC’s cadre of professional educators and contractors 
have been improving their system of education.  Although 
                     
62 The design of these classes is to draw the student into question / 
discussion and follow on question.  By breaking down hypothesis, 
reframing questions and then breaking these new hypothesis down again 
students grasp the importance of asking “why” and expand their view of 
how to problem solve.  Classes included The Military Advisor, Critical 
Thinking and Ethical Decision making, Building Consensus and 
Anthropology of Conflict.  
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SAMS claims to teach a student “how to think,” it is the 
author’s opinion that their curriculum lends itself more to 
assimilating knowledge and learning process.  This working 
knowledge base combined with understanding Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP), Joint Operation Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES) and Time-Phased Force and 
Deployment Data (TPFDD) processes allows the student to 
demonstrate what they have learned in conventional 
operational planning simulation exercises.  This teaching 
methodology is so remarkably efficient at creating 
operational planners that it has been exported, almost in 
its’ entirety, by the JAWS and SAW schoolhouses.   
3. Commonalities 
 Both SAMS and USSOCOM’s SOMDP have highly educated 
faculty members who are able to facilitate an advanced level 
of adult-style instruction.  Both programs maximize time 
spent in seminar environments and small group, interactive, 
professor-mediated learning.  This approach has proven to be 
more effective than traditional cognitive learning systems 
such as lectures.63  In fact, SAMS has removed nearly all 
its strictly didactic teaching.  The one exception is Very 
Important Person (VIP) briefs, which are the same as the 
Secretary of the Navy Guest Lectures (SGL) briefing program 
conducted at NPS. 
 
                     
63 Carl Ransom Rogers, Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education 
Might Become, C.E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969, 
http://adulted.about.com/cs/adultlearningthe/a/carl_rogers.htm., 
accessed 16 December 2007. Additional sources on adult learning include 
Malcolm Knowles, The Modern Practice of Adult Education: From Pedagogy 
to Andragogy, and Peter Rener’s The Art of Teaching Adults. 
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Both schools try to facilitate discussion in a 
combination of lecture and student engagement.  However, the 
POI required by SAMS ensures the discussion stays on track 
to meet specific learning objectives.  The smaller SAMS 
classroom may facilitate more discussion between each 
student and the instructor; however, this becomes negated by 
the requirement to accomplish all learning objectives listed 
within the class syllabi for a given period.  SOMDP 
professors are not tied to their syllabi.  This allows the 
professor the freedom to explore class subjects more 
thoroughly; extrapolating experiences and insights from the 
diverse student population to reinforce the subjects listed 
in the syllabi. 
Although the classroom subjects are different for each 
approach, the teaching methods employed by SAMS AMSP and 
USSOCOM’s SOMDP are the same.  I rank their teaching 
methodologies as equal.  
C. COMPARISON OF CURRICULUM 
 SOMDP is an eighteen-month, minimum twenty-one courses, 
thesis, plus mandatory symposia, roundtable forums and a 
robust series of guest speakers.64 
 SOMDP curriculum has several positive attributes.  
These include the greater level of overall curriculum hours 
required to receive a master’s degree and more devotion to 
development of thought process, reasoning, and adaptability 
to change.  However, this instruction requires an additional 
six months of time.  NPS awards graduates of SOMDP a 
                     
64 Brian Greenshields & Peter Gustaitis, Naval Postgraduate School: 
Training special operations personnel for certainty; educating for 
uncertainty, Special Warfare Magazine, (Sept-Oct 2008), 26. 
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Master’s of Science in Defense Analysis upon completion of 
the program.  An additional improvement to SOMDP is that now 
all ARSOF students can receive ILE credit (JPME I). 
In July [2008], the Army deputy chief of staff G3 
/5/ 7 granted full ILE / JPME I / MEL 4 credit 
for Army SF, CA and PSYOP officers attending 
SOMDP, providing that they complete four PME 
courses offered at the Naval War College’s 
Monterey satellite campus, conveniently located 
at NPS, and that they attend the two-week ILE 
Prep Course prior to reporting to NPS.65 
 The development of the thought processes and reasoning 
necessary for IW planning is as important a goal as covering 
the course content.  Courses on Critical Thinking and 
Ethical Decision Making, Guerilla Warfare, Anatomy of 
Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Deception, War in 
the Information Age, and the Military Advisor, to name a 
few, impress upon the IW student the need to “open the 
aperture”.  This allows the professors to create, or expand 
upon the lens or framework each student possesses for 
analytical reasoning.  The NPS program uses such subjects as 
terrorist financing, dark networks, social network analysis, 
culture and influence, wicked problems and the rise of 
religious violence to teach various tenets of IW based on 
those subjects.  Students recognize that the analytical 
tools they are developing are of functional utility and 
application against almost any problem set, not just IW 
operational problems. 
 Changes in warfare are inevitable, and the curriculum 
must adapt to these changes in order to meet the needs of 
                     
65 Brian Greenshields & Peter Gustaitis, Naval Postgraduate School: 
Training special operations personnel for certainty; educating for 
uncertainty, Special Warfare Magazine, (September-October 2008), 27. 
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the military.  NPS hires only professors with recognized 
academic scholarship and subject matter expertise in the 
field of study they are teaching, and gives those 
instructors the latitude to organize, update, and teach 
their own subjects.  At the micro level, student feedback, 
in the form of end-of-course reviews and daily interaction 
with the department chair, can initiate syllabus changes.  
At the macro level, the SOMDP has two approval processes 
that can revise or create additional courses.  The first is 
the biennial USSOCOM validation process.  The second is 
NPS’s accreditation by the Accrediting Commission for Senior 
Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of 
Schools and Colleges (WASC).66  This accreditation occurs 
every ten years.67  As of September 2009 NPS is currently 
undergoing WASC accreditation.  There are no major 
deficiencies or required changes to SOMDP noted.  JSOU 
officially conducts SOCOM’s bi-annual review.  Besides JSOU 
the SOCOM J9 Special Operations Knowledge and Futures Center 
(SOKF) provides educational experts to all SOCOM’s learning 
centers to review POIs and ensure continuity of quality 
training and education.  JSOU’s most recent review of the 
                     
66 The Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities of 
the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC) accredits NPS.  
Within the school, the Aeronautical, Electrical, and Mechanical 
Engineering curricula are further accredited by the Accrediting Board 
for Engineering and Technology (ABET), and the Systems Management 
curricula are accredited by the National Association of Schools of 
Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) and the American Association 
of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/QLinks/Accreditation.html, (accessed 27 
November 2007). 
67 NPS’ first accreditation by WASC was 1955, their last 
accreditation was 1999, NPS’ next accreditation is scheduled for 2009.  
Info accessed via web 16 December 2007, 
http://www.wascsenior.org/wasc/Doc_Lib/2006_2007SeniorDirectory.pdf.   
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SOMDP is scheduled for October of 2009.68  To ensure no 
duplication of lesson plan revisions and courses within its 
various schools, an NPS review board made up of members of 
the faculty reviews course requirements and makes 
recommendations to the school and department heads as 
necessary.  This makes the program highly flexible, with POI 
updates occurring as rapidly as necessary to keep up with 
the evolving IW environment.   
 It is the author’s opinion that there are two 
curriculia positives and two negatives from the SAMS POI.  
The positives include SAMS use of computer simulations for 
practical exercises and the strength of courses to create 
conventional campaign planners.  The negative elements of 
the SAMS approach include limited interactive learning and 
the Army bureaucracy, which makes affecting changes to the 
POI cumbersome and slow. 
    SAMS greatest advantage is their use of practical 
exercises and computer simulation to take classroom 
instruction and provide empirical feedback to the students.  
The curriculum of AMSP consists of five courses (Strategic 
Decision Making, Art of Design, Applied National Power, 
Evolution of Operational Art, 21st Century Conflict), three 
design practices, a GCC computer simulation exercise 
covering the joint operations planning process (JOPP), a 
Joint Task Force (JTF) or Division computer simulation 
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) exercise and a forty 
to fifty page monograph with oral defense.69 
                     
68 Brian Greenshields, NPS SOF-chair, E-mail message to author, 
September 3, 2009. 
69 Andrew M. Johnson, SOF chair SAMS, e-mail and phone conversation 
with author, December 10, 2008. 
 52
 Limited interactive learning occurs within the SAMS 
program due to strict adherence to Terminal Learning 
Objectives (TLOs) and Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) 
within the allotted block of instruction (generally 90 to 
120 minutes, based on core or elective class).  SAMS 
instructors must carefully guide additional classroom 
discussion or tangential subjects in order to reach the 
expected TLOs for the lesson plan.  SAMS instructors do have 
considerable latitude in determining whether each student 
has demonstrated the requirements spelled out in the 
“Assessment Plan” for each lesson plan.  Although 
subjective, in several interviews conducted by the author, 
neither students nor instructors perceived that time 
constraints resulted in a minimization of student-sponsored 
participation in classroom discussion.70 
 All CGSC (including SAMS, and CGSOC) electives and 
operational planning exercises must go through a curriculum 
review process to change curricula.  A designated CGSC forum 
reviews each core course annually.  The forum consists of 
student representatives, department heads and primary 
instructors who work with the Dean of Academics during these 
annual reviews.  Faculty members have the latitude to teach 
the learning objectives as they choose, but they cannot 
alter those objectives; this may occur only during the 
curriculum review process.  The elective courses in the SAMS 
program, such as the SOF chair sponsored IW electives, do 
not receive the same rigorous review as the core courses.  
Therefore, faculty members have full latitude to make 
                     
70 Timothy Heinemann, & Andrew, Johnson, E-mail messages to author, October 
through November 2007.  Col (R) Heinemann was the  CGSOC Dean of Academics from 
2000-2003,  and LTC Johnson is the current senior officer School of Advanced 
Military Studies, CGSC Special Operations Education Element.  
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changes and updates to their syllabi internally.71  
Accreditation of SAMS occurs through the Command and General 
Staff College within the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center at 
Ft. Leavenworth.  TRADOC accredits all versions of Command 
and General Staff Officers Course/Intermediate Learning 
Education (CGSOC/ILE) for intermediate PME and leader 
development.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
accredits all versions of CGSOC/ILE JPME Phase 1.  The North 
Central Association (NCA) of the Higher Learning Commission 
is the regional agency charged with accrediting those 
institutions that grant undergraduate and graduate degrees; 
these institutions include CGSOC/ILE and SAMS, which offer 
the Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS).  Fort 
Leavenworth’s Command General Staff College accreditation by 
NCA occurred in 2005.72  There is no formal accreditation 
requirement between CGSC and NCA; however, TRADOC, the U.S. 
Army Quality Assurance Office and the CGSOC Staff and 
Faculty Council do have annual requirements to inspect and 
make recommendations back to the school. 
 The curriculum at SAMS is as successful at teaching 
conventional operational planning as the SOMDP curriculum is 
at teaching critical thinking and training capable 
                     
71 Command and General Staff College Dean of Academics 2000-2003 
Colonel (R) Timothy Heinemann, e-mail correspondence with author. 27 
November 2007. 
72 Accreditation data on all CGSC schools was accessed December 2, 
2007 via CGSC’s web site, 
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/QAO/dao_faqs.asp.  As part of the 
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, CGSC falls under the authority 
of TRADOC at Fort Monroe Va.  As mandated by TRADOC, the Quality 
Assurance Office (QAO) publishes the master evaluation plan on an annual 
basis to project evaluation and assessment requirements.  In addition to 
the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association, CGSC is 
subject to periodic professional accreditation review by two bodies 
within DoD.  Teams from TRADOC and Process for Accreditation of Joint 
Education Office (PAJE) both visited CGSC and filed reports extending 
accreditation of joint and professional military education programs.    
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operators, using the study of IW as a focus.  Both schools 
have systems for accreditation in place.  The programs are 
similar in their classroom teaching methods, but USSOCOM 
SOMDP has a much more diversified curriculum for teaching 
students how to think about IW.  USSOCOM’s SOMDP at NPS is 
much more flexible for curriculum changes, with less 
bureaucracy for approval. 
 The primary areas that USSOCOM’s approach is better 
than SAMS are in curriculum diversity and flexibility to 
change to meet real world educational demands.  This is not 
a significant edge in my view, and I rate curriculum as even 
between both approaches. 
 
    
   


















VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The 2006 QDR identified a need to improve IW competency 
in the DoD.  It established specific and measurable goals 
for both USSOCOM and the Services.  One aspect was to 
develop systems to train IW Specialists.  Organizational 
behavior, both good and bad, influences the response by 
USSOCOM and SAMS.  USSOCOM recommended additional SOF-
Chairs, exportable IW blocks of instruction and the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s SOMDP to address IW Execution Roadmap 
task 2.6.8.  USSOCOM then developed a three-phase approach 
in response to IW Execution Roadmap task 2.6.9(U) to 
leverage JSOU, ILE, advanced ILE and SOMDP to create the SOF 
IW Campaign Strategist / Planner.   
 In the findings portion of this chapter the author 
lists the “best practices” discovered from both approaches 
(conventional and IW campaign planner education).  In the 
conclusions portion of this chapter the author expands three 
areas for improvement in the USSOCOM response to QDR task 
2.6.9(U).  These areas include curriculum, computer 
simulations/exercises and education oversight (proponency).  
In the recommendations portion of the chapter, the author 
builds a revised SOF IW Strategist / Planner education model 
that incorporates the “best practices” gleamed from 
analyzing both the SAM program and USSOCOM’s proposed 
approach to IW campaign planner education.   
A. FINDINGS 
From the USSOCOM approach, my analysis determined the 
faculty is its best practice.  The teaching method, 
curriculum and student selection process are of equal 
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caliber to the SAMS program of campaign planner education.  
The SAMS program is better then USSOCOM’s approach at 
student tracking, program oversight (proponency) and 
incorporating computer simulations and staff practical 
exercises.   
B. CONCLUSIONS: THREE AREAS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
USSOCOM’S APPROACH 
1. Curriculum 
 The author recommends three additional courses to 
“round-out” the curriculum of the SOMDP.  These courses are 
Crisis Action Planning (CAP), Interagency Planning and 
Coordination, and Stability Operations (which covers the 
mission requirements for Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and 
Security Force Assistance (SFA)).  The requirement for the 
addition of these three courses within the SOMDP POI is due 
to the fact they represent the three areas SAMS students 
receive current IW related education, not conducted within 
the SOMDP.73  SOMDP does not educate students on the “whole 
of government” approach used by the rest of the U.S. 
Government when discussing the forms of foreign power 
engagement strategies, or the Interagency Management System 
(IMS) available to the U.S. government.  SAMS recognizes 
that a conventional operational planner who only comprehends 
the DIME principles and incorporates four of the expanded 
                     
73 Stability Operations instruction is available at NPS through the 
Civil-Military Relations - Curriculum 685,  , and Stabilization & 
Reconstruction - Curriculum 686, NS 4236 Stability Operations, accessed 
via internet, 14 December 2008, 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GeneralCatalog/Home.htm. 
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seven aspects74 of foreign policy available to the U.S. 
Government is doomed to prepare an inadequate campaign plan, 
uncoordinated with the rest of the Interagency (IA).  The 
last class, Crisis Action Planning (CAP) is a shortened 
version of the seventeen-step MDMP process.  It would 
introduce the student to JOPES and TPFDD data manipulation.  
The CAP process, taught at SAMS and part of JPME II 
curriculum could be taught at SOMDP by the Navy War College 
(NWC) staff currently assigned at NPS to teach JPME I.  An 
alternate course of action could be for instructors from 
U.S. Naval War College (NWC) teach the CAP process in 
temporary assigned duty (TAD) status at NPS.  
2. Computer Simulations and Exercises  
SAMS, the other Services’ advanced studies programs, 
and the War Colleges use capstone exercises and computer-
simulated staff exercises in addition to classroom 
curriculum.  These exercises augment lessons learned in the 
classroom with practical application through simulation.  
This is labor, time, and instructor intensive.  However, it 
provides the students real feedback on what they retained 
and are able to apply in a real-world situation.   
To round out the student experience at NPS, the SOMDP 
should create IW related capstone events in each of the 
SOMDP sub-curricula.  At a minimum, students should conduct  
 
                     
74 DIME stands for diplomatic, informational, military and economic.  
There are several newer acronyms for analyzing a system: MIDLIFERS, 
PMESII etc.  Although there is no doctrinal “right answer,” most GCC, 
TSOC and Corps staffs the author has witnessed use the seven engagement 
strategies known as DIMEFILE: diplomacy, information, military, 
economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement.   
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an IW capstone event in the Joint Information Operations 
track, the Irregular Warfare track, and the Counter-
Terrorism track. 
3. Educational Oversight 
 The Joint Staff adjudicated IW education proponency 
with DoD Directive 3000.7.  USSOCOM is the proponent for 
development for SOF doctrine relevant to IW, and will 
“contribute to the integration of SOF-GPF IW relevant 
doctrine with CDRUSJFCOM, CJCS and Secretaries of the 
Military Departments.”75  The USSOCOM J-9 staff section 
within SOKF that reviews education, in conjunction with 
JSOU, and SOCOM J-10 (IW Directorate) should become the 
facilitator and advocate of all USSOCOM IW education. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The author proposes the creation of a new USSOCOM SOF 
IW Strategist / Campaign Planner model.  It is the author’s 
opinion that the three-phase approach is unnecessary.  
JSOU’s modules (Phase one) are of great value for anyone 
going to a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), or any 
location within the USSOCOM staff.  Any officer who 
completes ILE and SAMS or SOMDP (Phases Two and Three) is an 
IW Strategist / Planner according to the JS action memo; 
therefore, the Phase one training is not necessary.  
Advanced ILEs and SOMDP are the “centers of gravity” for IW 
education according to the Joint Staff.  The focus of 
USSOCOM’s IW training should revolve around creating the 
best course of instruction leveraging these already 
                     
75 DoD Directive 3000.07, December 1, 2008, subparagraph 11a-d, 9-10. 
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recognized “centers of gravity.”  Currently the SOF chairs 
at each advanced ILE are working with JSOU and the Joint 
Staff to incorporate more blocks of IW instruction into 
their POIs. 
The author recommends teaching the entire new “expanded 
SOMDP” at NPS’ Monterey campus.  The “expanded SOMDP” would 
add additional instruction and incorporate computer 
simulations and staff exercises, with a capstone event.  
This additional education would add six months of time to 
the current eighteen month POI.  The Services could absorb 
this additional time, if all students attending SOMDP 
attended NWC ILE instruction and received credit for JPME I 
while attending the “expanded SOMDP.”  USSOCOM, as the 
proponent for SOF IW Strategist / Campaign Planner 
education, must gain accreditation for the SOMDP from the 
Joint Staff.  This would ensure SOF IW Strategists / 
Planners could be tracked and placed in staff positions to 
execute full-spectrum IW operations in joint, multinational 
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VII. THE WAY-AHEAD 
This thesis conducted an analysis of two systems, SAMS 
AMSP and USSOCOM’s SOMDP.  It combined the best practices of 
both into a recommended hybrid system for USSOCOM to adopt. 
Considerations that require additional research may 
include, but are not limited to the following: 
 1.  Conduct a cost estimate for NPS to expand SOMDP to 
include military computer simulations, JOPP, Operational 
MDMP Crisis Action Planning (CAP) seminars and the 
additional six-month time requirement. 
 2.  Conduct a DoD wide manpower survey to determine the 
number and placement of IW Strategist and Campaign Planners 
required to support the general-purpose forces (GPF) and SOF 
units. 
 3.  Develop a system to allow the Services to identify 
and track IW campaign planners for assignment to best 
utilize their skills.   
 4.  Is it possible to create a system of human resource 
management to track the IW specialists beyond their DoD 
careers?  This would allow utilization of their special 







                     
76 For more on IW planners/leaders post career marketability, see The 
McCormick Tribune Foundation’s essay on Irregular Warfare Leadership in 
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